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Abstract 
Unemployment is undoubtedly one of the most important concerns in developed countries, especially in Europe. Most 
of the related economic literature has discussed the possible influence of unemployment benefits on unemployment 
and welfare, assuming a lump-sum type benefit system, while the more realistic earnings-related (replacement rate) 
regime has been scarcely considered. Applying a fairly standard monopoly union model, we show that when 
unemployment benefit is related to the existing wage, the rate of unemployment can be reduced by increasing both the 
replacement rate and the labour tax. 
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     1. Introduction 
 
Unemployment  benefits  have  been  recognised  as  an  important  feature  of  modern  economies 
(especially in European Union countries) and as playing a preeminent role in determining labour 
market  outcomes.  Most  of  the  economic  literature  discussing  the  possible  influence  of 
unemployment benefit policies on unemployment and welfare assumes a lump-sum type benefit 
system (e.g., Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). However, in several OECD 
countries  unemployment  benefits  consist  of  both  unemployment  insurance  and  unemployment 
assistance, with the former being related either to current or to previous labour earnings (see Heer, 
2006).
1 In other words, unemployment benefits are generally paid according to a replacement rate 
fixed by law as a fraction of either the past or existing gross wage. 
    Two other distinctive features of several European Union countries are represented by (i) the 
widespread unionisation of labour markets and (ii) the presence of high labour income taxation. All 
these features (unemployment benefit policies, unionisation, large wage taxation) are held to some 
extent responsible for a typical scourge of modern European economies: i.e., the persistently high 
rates of unemployment. In particular, Daveri and Tabellini (2000, pp. 50–51) argued: “European 
labour costs have increased for many reasons, one of which is particularly easy to identify: higher 
taxes on labour… if workers are organised in monopolistic unions and their income, if unemployed, 
is taxed at a lower rate than wages, then they can succeed in shifting the burden of labour taxes onto 
firms. In this case, a permanent rise in labour taxes permanently increases unemployment.” In order 
to explain this line of reasoning, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) presented an overlapping generations 
(OLG) model of growth where equilibrium unemployment is caused by a monopolistic union which 
seeks to set the wage (fixed as a mark-up over the lump-sum unemployment benefit) above the 
prevailing competitive level, while leaving employment to be chosen by firms according to their 
labour demand curves, and concluded that employment is permanently damaged in the occurrence 
of an increase in labour costs due to increased labour taxation. 
    In  this  paper  we  address  the  following  issue:  how  the  prevailing  common  wisdom  linking 
increasing  unemployment  with  the  high  degree  of  unionisation  of  labour  markets,  high  labour 
income taxation and the generous unemployment benefit system, may change when unemployment 
benefits are determined as a fraction of the existing gross wage paid to employees (defined as the 
replacement rate – RR – regime)?
2 We show that when the monopoly union chooses the wage in the 
RR unemployment benefit regime, then –  in contrast with the  lump-sum (LSB) unemployment 
benefit regime – the resulting equilibrium unemployment is negatively related with both the labour 
tax and the replacement rate. Therefore, when the union  fixes the wage  in the RR regime, the 
policymaker  may  permanently  reduce  the  rate  of  unemployment  by  increasing  either  the 
                                                 
1 Note that while in this paper we investigate the effects of (lump-sum and earnings-related) unemployment benefits and 
labour taxes on the rate of unemployment within a theoretical partial equilibrium monopoly union model, Heer (2006) 
considered a calibrated general equilibrium OLG economy with elastic labour supply and income uncertainty, and then 
analysed the effects of both types of unemployment benefit regimes on output, employment and welfare, but without 
considering the role of unions. Unlike Heer (2006), who studied – in particular – the effects of switching from a lump-
sum type benefit system to an earnings-related scheme assuming also that the unemployment benefit budget balances, 
we concentrate here on the effects  of moving the benefit system toward a replacement-rate regime on the rate of 
unemployment  when  the labour market  is unionised  and no  government  balanced  budget  policies  exist.  However, 
following the suggestion of both an anonymous referee and the editor John Conley, we show that our findings hold even 
when the overall feedback effect of the government balanced budget is taken into account, i.e., labour tax receipts are 
equal to unemployment benefits (see the Appendix). 
2  For  instance,  the  Italian  unemployment  insurance  system  (Cassa  Integrazione  Guadagni)  pays  benefits  for 
unemployed hours due to temporary and partial layoffs, and includes almost 80 per cent of the current wage. It is 
evident that, in practice, if wages subsequently increase, firms will lay off the appropriate number of workers, and 
unemployed people will receive a fraction of the existing wage; the union will then rationally take this fact into account 
when choosing the wage for its members.   1 
replacement rate or the labour tax or both. This result appears in sharp contrast with the preceding 
literature.
3 
    Moreover, the model has been extended in a twofold direction. In particular, besides the basic 
case  in  which  the  unemployment  benefit  is  untaxed,  as  in  Daveri  and  Tabellini  (2000),  we 
considered (i) a taxed unemployment benefit, and (ii) a balanced budget unemployment benefit 
policy.  Interestingly,  in  the  RR  regime,  the  negative  monotonic  relationship  between  the 
unemployment rate and the replacement rate is preserved in both cases. 
    The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we develop the monopoly union 
model and the main results of the paper are analysed and discussed in both the LSB and the RR 
regimes. Section 3 concludes. Moreover, in the Appendix we extend the RR model by assuming 
that the unemployment insurance budget balances. 
 
2. The monopoly union model 
 
In this section we analyse and discuss the role played by the monopolistic union in determining the 
wage received by its members,  t w , (see, for instance, Booth, 2002; Layard et al., 2005) under two 
different unemployment benefit regimes: the lump-sum regime and the replacement rate regime. 
Then we study how the aggregate rate of unemployment reacts to a permanent increase in both the 
labour tax and the benefit payment. In particular, we closely follow the structure adopted, amongst 
many others, by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). 
    Workers of each firm are represented by a union. We assume that a given fraction  1 0 £ < q  of 
current workers belongs to the union. Notice that union membership is exogenously fixed, whereas 
the number of employed individuals is endogenously determined.
4 Moreover, we assume that: 
 
    1) the union is large enough to have market power, but small enough to neglect the effects of 
their action on the macroeconomic variables (e.g., fiscal policy variables and the interest rate are 
taken as given); 
 
    2) it operates at the firm level, such that the welfare of the current elderly is not affected; 
 
    3) it affects the welfare of those currently active only through their current income; 
 
    4) it neglects risk aversion and maximises the expected income (rather than the expected utility) 
of its members. 
 
    In  what  follows  we  analyse  the  effects  of  both  the  LSB  and  the  RR  unemployment  benefit 
regimes on the aggregate rate of unemployment. 
 
2.1. Monopoly union: the LSB regime 
 
In order to set the wage in each period the union faces the following static optimization problem 
(given by the maximisation of the expected income of a risk neutral representative member):
5 
                                                 
3 In fact, in the fight against unemployment it is held that “Moderating the overall level of taxation, and mostly of taxes 
on labour, is thus one of the main challenges currently faced by the European Union.” (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000, p. 
54),  and  “the  general  argument  usually  put  forward  is  that  unemployment  benefits  improve  the  pay  off  of  not 
working.”(Heer, 2006, p. 530). 
4 As is usually assumed, if the number of union members is higher than the number of employed individuals, then all 
employed people belong to the union; otherwise, the union’s wage would no longer be “binding”. 
5 It is worth noting that the seemingly myopic behaviour of the union, which only cares about the income of current 
members, is a simple shortcut for a more general setting where the union is infinitely lived but cannot commit itself to 
the future course of action, as noted by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). Notice also that problem (1) implies that the union   2 
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1 ,  (2) 
where  0 > t b  (the – untaxed – lump-sum unemployment benefit) and  q are given,  1 0 < <t  is the 
constant labour income tax, and the ratio  ( ) q ut / 1-  represents the fraction of the union members 
that find a job with  t u  being the time-t aggregate rate of unemployment. Notice also that firms 
have the right to hire workers according to their labour demand curves. Therefore, once the wage 
has  been  fixed  by  the  union,  the  corresponding  aggregate  employment  rate  is  lower  than  the 
equilibrium  with  full-employment.  Assuming  identical  firms  endowed  with  a  Cobb-Douglas 
technology, i.e. aggregate production takes place according to 
a a - =
1
t t t L AK Y , where  t Y ,  t K  and 
( ) t t t N u L - = 1  represent aggregate production, the capital stock and the labour input hired in the 
representative firm, respectively, with  t N  being the number of individuals at time t, the aggregate 
unemployment rate is determined by Eq. (2). Moreover,  0 > A  is a production scale parameter, 
1 0 < <a  is the capital’s weight in technology and  t t t N K k / :=  represents the per capita stock of 
capital at time t. 
    The economic interpretation of Eq. (1) is straightforward: the first term is the net wage times the 
probability  of  finding  a  job,  while  the  second  term  is  the  unemployment  benefit  times  the 
probability of being unemployed. 
    Firstly, we note that, in any case, the level of the lump-sum unemployment benefit must be lower 
than the prevailing wage; otherwise, nobody would have obviously the incentive to work. 
    Secondly, for the sake of analytical comparison with the RR model which is analysed in the next 
section, we now consider,  in  line with the above consideration, that the level of the  lump-sum 
unemployment benefit may be seen as equivalent to a fraction of the prevailing competitive wage 
( t c w , ), that is,  t c t w b , × = g  with  1 0 < < g . Of course, such an equivalence is implicit in all models 
with a lump-sum unemployment benefit because it must be smaller than the existing wage. 
    Maximisation of (1), taking  t b  as given, results in the following union’s wage: 







w ,  (3) 
which may be written equivalently as 










w ,  (3.1) 
where  ( )
a a t t c Ak w - = 1 ,  holds in equilibrium. Eq. (3.1) reveals that the optimal wage for the union 
is a constant mark-up over the competitive wage. In order to guarantee  t c t LSB w w , , >  we need the 
constant  fraction  of  the  prevailing  market  wage  to  be  sufficiently  high,  that  is  g g > ,  where 
( )( ) t a g - - = 1 1 : . As can easily be seen from Eq. (3.1), the union’s wage depends positively on 
both the unemployment benefit and the wage tax, that is, the higher the labour tax or, alternatively, 
the unemployment benefit, the higher the wage required by the union for its members. 
    Given this wage setting formulation, and knowing that the representative firm has the right to hire 
as  many  workers  as  dictated  by  the  perceived  labour  demand  curve,  the  resulting  equilibrium 
unemployment is: 
                                                                                                                                                            
maximises the aggregate income of current members or, alternatively, it maximises the income distribution among 
employed and unemployed individuals by equating their marginal utilities.   3 











- = LSB u .  (4) 
From Eq. (4) it is easy to see that  1 0 < < LSB u  if and only if  g g > . 
 
2.2. Monopoly union: the RR regime 
 
We now assume that the union faces the problem of maximising Eq. (1) subject to Eq. (2) and 
  t t w b × = g ,  (5) 
where  1 0 < < g  is a constant fraction of the current wage (i.e., the replacement rate). 
    Therefore, the union’s wage is now: 
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.  (6) 
    Given Eq. (6), the equilibrium unemployment rate is determined by: 
  ( )( ) ( ) [ ]
( )( ) t g a
a g t a
- - -
- - - - -
=
1 1
1 1 1 1 q
uRR .  (7) 
Without loss of generality, we set  1 = q , i.e. all workers belong to the union. Therefore, Eqs. (6) 
and (7) become: 
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RR u .  (9) 
From Eq. (8), it can easily be seen that the replacement rate must be low enough, that is  g g < , to 
guarantee that  t c t RR w w , , > . This is exactly the opposite of the condition required in the LSB regime. 
    Eq. (8) shows that the union’s wage depends negatively on both the unemployment benefit and 
the wage tax, that is, the higher is the labour income tax or, alternatively, the replacement rate, the 
lower is the wage required by the union for its members. Moreover, from Eq. (9) it is easy to see 
that  1 0 < < RR u  if and only if  g g < . 
 
2.3. Unemployment: LSB versus RR 
 
We  now  compare  the  unemployment  rate  determined  according  to  the  LSB  regime  with  that 
obtained under the RR hypothesis. 
    From Eqs. (4) and (9) the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition 1. (1) Let  g g >  hold. Then, in the LSB regime a rise in g  and/or in the wage tax t  
increases monotonically the unemployment rate; (2) Let  g g <  hold. Then, in the RR regime a rise 
in g  and/or in the wage tax t  reduces monotonically the unemployment rate. 
 
Proof. The proof uses the following derivatives. 
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LSB LSB u u
,     4 
for any  g g > . 
    In the RR regime: 






























,   
for any  g g < . Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 1 reveals that under the RR hypothesis a rise in the replacement rate and/or in the 
labour tax permanently reduces the unemployment rate. In fact, when the union chooses the wage in 
the RR regime it takes into account the effects of the existing wage on the unemployment benefit. 
For this reason the wage fixed by the union depends negatively on both the labour tax and the 
replacement rate. As a consequence, given the positive relationship between unemployment and 
wages, a higher labour income tax as well as a higher replacement rate is found to reduce aggregate 
unemployment permanently. 
    Moreover, comparison of Eqs. (4) and (9) gives the following remark: 
 
Remark 1. In both the LSB and the RR regimes, a rise in the capital’s weight in technology, a , 
monotonically reduces the unemployment rate.
6 
 
Therefore, the LSB and the RR systems give rise to opposite effects as regards the role played by 
the unemployment benefit on the rate of unemployment, while showing the same effect as regards 
the role played by the capital’s weight in technology. 
 
2.4. Taxing unemployment benefit 
 
So  far,  following  Daveri  and  Tabellini  (2000),
7  we  assumed  the  unemployment  benefit  to  be 
untaxed in both the LSB and the RR models. In what follows, we test the robustness of our previous 
results, showing that Proposition 1 in Section 2.3 still holds even if the unemployment benefit is 
taxed at the same rate as the existing wage. 
    Therefore,  by  relaxing  the  hypothesis  of  untaxed  unemployment  benefits  (and  setting  1 = q  
without any loss of generality), Eq. (1) becomes:
8 
  { } ( ) [ ] ( ) t - × + - = 1 1 max t t t t t w b u w u I
t ,  (1’) 
where  t u  is still determined by Eq. (2). 









w ,  (3’) 
which may be written equivalently as 
                                                 
6  This  can  easily  be  ascertained  by  differentiating  Eqs.  (4)  and  (9)  with respect  to  a ,  i.e.,  0 / < ¶ ¶ a LSB u   and 
0 / < ¶ ¶ a RR u . 
7  Daveri  and  Tabellini  (2000)  assumed  an  untaxed  unemployment  benefit  regime,  claiming  (p.  58)  that:  “this 
assumption is correct if income when unemployed is earned in the underground economy, or if it proxies for the utility 
from additional leisure time. Indeed, in a number of industrial countries the underground economy is the main source of 
income for many unemployed workers.” Moreover, in Table 3 (p. 59) they showed that in several developed countries 
(such as Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US), unemployment benefits are either slightly taxed or even untaxed. 
8 It is worth noting that introducing a tax on unemployment benefit is equivalent to assuming that the payment of 












w .  (3.1’) 













- = LSB u .  (4’) 
In the RR model, instead, by taking into account the effects of the benefit system in Eq. (1’), i.e. 
t t w b × = g , we obtain: 
  ( )( )












,  (8’) 







RR u .  (9’) 
    Therefore, if the unemployment benefit is taxed at the same rate as the existing wage, both the 
union’s wage and the equilibrium unemployment rate are independent of the labour income tax. By 
simple inspection of Eqs. (8’) and (9’), it follows that both Proposition 1 as regards the role of  g  




Using the standard monopoly union model, we analysed the effects of unemployment benefits and 
labour  taxes  on  the  unemployment  rate  when  the  former  are  related  to the  existing  wage  (the 
replacement rate – RR – regime) rather than  assumed to be of the  lump-sum type (LSB). We 
showed that when a monopolistic union fixes the wage in the RR regime, then in contrast with the 
LSB regime, the resulting equilibrium unemployment depends negatively on both the labour tax and 
the replacement rate. This occurs because the unemployment benefit is a fraction, e.g., fixed by law, 
of the wage earned by current employees, and the union will rationally take this fact into account 
when choosing the wage for its members. Interestingly, this result holds if unemployment benefits 
are  either  untaxed  or  taxed  at  the  same  rate  as  the  existing  wage.  Moreover,  the  negative 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the replacement rate is preserved even when the 
overall feedback effect of the government balanced budget is taken into account, that is, the labour 
tax receipt is equal to the unemployment benefit (see the Appendix). The essential message of the 
present paper, therefore, is that, under our assumption of RR regime, a policymaker should increase 
(rather than decrease) both the unemployment benefit and the labour tax in order to reduce the 
unemployment rate permanently. 
    The interest of these results lies not only in the simplicity with which are obtained, that is, within 
the conventional monopoly union model, but also in the fact that it shows a new perspective for 
unemployment benefit and (labour) tax policies when the former are determined as a percentage of 
the existing wage (the replacement rate). Finally, as regards the future research agenda, a natural 
extension of the present paper might be to consider the effects of both lump-sum and earnings-
related unemployment benefit systems on the unemployment rate when (i) the labour supply is 
endogenously determined, (ii) the union cares not only about the wage but also the unemployment 





Analysis of the monopoly union model in the main text was performed in a partial equilibrium 
context where both the unemployment benefit and the labour tax were exogenously given, and thus 
unrelated to each other. Below we extend the RR untaxed model (see Section 2.2 in the main text)   6 
to include a government balanced budget unemployment benefit policy, i.e. labour taxes are equal 
to unemployment benefits. We then investigate whether the counterintuitive negative relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the replacement rate still remains valid as long as the labour 
tax t  is chosen endogenously by the government to finance the benefit system.
9 
    Let the unemployment benefit policy 
  ( ) t t t t t u b u w = - 1 t ,  (A1) 
hold (i.e., unemployment benefits are assumed to be entirely financed by the government with 










t .  (A2) 
In the untaxed RR regime, the union’s wage is determined by Eq. (8) and thus the equilibrium 
unemployment rate is expressed by Eq. (9). Therefore, exploiting (9) and the government budget 
(A2) to eliminate  t t , the constant equilibrium unemployment rate in the balanced budget untaxed 









RR u .  (A3) 
Eq. (A3) reveals that  1 0 < < RR u  if and only if  g g < , where  a g - =1 : . 
    Therefore, the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition A.1. Let  g g <  hold. Then, in a balanced budget RR regime, a rise in g  reduces the 
unemployment rate monotonically. 
 












.   
for any  g g < . Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition  A.1  reveals  that  a  rise  in  the  replacement  rate  permanently  reduces  the  rate  of 
unemployment even under the hypothesis of a balanced budget RR regime. Therefore, the negative 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the replacement rate is found to be a robust feature 
of the unionised-wage economy with RR systems, both when unemployment benefits and labour 
taxes are exogenously given (thus implying no feedback effects of the government budget on the 
equilibrium unemployment rate) and when the overall feedback effect of the government balanced 
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